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ESSAY
The Implications of Inequality for Fiscal
Federalism (or Why the Federal Government
Should Pay for Local Public Schools)
BRIAN HIGHSMITH†
ABSTRACT
In designing public policy, a question of first principle is the
degree to which government services—and the mechanisms of
collecting revenue to finance those services—should be centralized
within and across political systems. To inform their assessments of
where redistribution should properly occur, public finance
researchers have, to date, worked backwards from different
assumptions about the mobility of residents within the political
community. Scholars have disagreed about the viability of local
governments’ efforts to redistribute wealth—with traditionalists
arguing that these efforts are made impossible by residential
mobility, and recent reformists countering that limitations on
mobility indeed allow for limited redistribution at the local level.
But these arguments have largely sidestepped questions about
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what level of centralization is theoretically optimal for
redistributive programs. And by focusing on the empirical question
of residential mobility, they have ignored a variable that—I seek to
demonstrate—is at least as important. In this Essay, I argue that
those two deficiencies in the literature are connected. I introduce a
simple model to show that economic redistribution becomes more
difficult—indeed, approaches impossibility—as economic inequality
increases, regardless of one’s assumptions about levels of mobility
(by the rich or poor). That is because economic inequality has an
inherent spatial dimension: so long as citizens exhibit anything
short of perfect mobility (and perfect responsiveness to
redistributive policy), its rise will result in an increasing geographic
concentration of fiscal resources available to governments. For this
reason, higher levels of economic inequality strengthen the case for
centralizing the financing of any public good or program with
redistributive goals—including the great bulk of what
contemporary governments aim to do.
I introduce the concept of a “fiscal unit” to refer to the geographic
scope of public financing—which might be, depending on the
program, a school district boundary, a county, a state, or the entire
country. In order to achieve an equitable allocation of public goods,
policymakers should respond to rising income inequality by shifting
the site of revenue collection to occur at widely drawn “fiscal units”.
This can take two forms. It can be done by expanding the scope of
fiscal boundaries—for example, by funding locally-administered
programs at the state or federal level. Alternatively, policymakers
could respond to inequality by increasing fiscal transfers from
higher levels of government (wider fiscal units) to lower,
geographically smaller governments.
Rather than an afterthought, the existing level of economic
inequality within a political community may be the single most
important question for this aspect of policy design. Where wealth is
unequally distributed, the primary responsibility of assessing the
revenues used to finance public goods should be assumed by levels
of government representing the greatest number of people. This
paper thus suggests that policymakers should respond to rising
income inequality by shifting not only the burden but also the site
of redistributive taxation.

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, American states, counties, and
municipalities have undertaken aggressive efforts to shift
the cost of operating their courts and criminal punishment
systems onto heavily-policed communities. Facing political
and economic pressures, they have constructed elaborate
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systems to extract onerous payments from vulnerable
families already living on the margins.1 As a result of these
efforts, people who have contact with the criminal legal
system are frequently left with unaffordable debts that
create acute hardship for vulnerable families and extract
wealth from poor communities. This injustice has many
causes, but it is perpetuated by the fiscal policy decision to
fund local courts locally—through revenue assessed from
residents who are cycled through the legal system—rather
than through redistributive taxes on sources of income and
wealth, including from people and corporations outside the
distressed communities that are targeted by law
enforcement. As one recent report concluded, “many local
governments have become more reliant on [revenues from
fines and fees], in part because state financial support for
municipal services has eroded . . . .”2 It is for this reason that
many civil rights advocates fighting the imposition of court
debt have organized around a call to fund judicial systems
from general revenues collected at the state level.3
A similar dynamic has resulted in sharp funding
disparities across local school districts. Because American
public schools receive, on average, around half of their
funding from local tax revenues,4 schools in high-poverty

1. See Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: CashRegister Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 1483, 1540 (2016)
(“Rising expense in the criminal justice system and shrinking public budgets
have resulted in a cost transfer from state and county courts to those arrested,
indicted, and convicted, imposing a heavy burden of criminal justice debt on a
largely indigent population.”).
2. Michael Leachman et al., Advancing Racial Equity With State Tax Policy,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 17 (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org
/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-15-18sfp.pdf.
3. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, CONFRONTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DEBT: A GUIDE FOR POLICY REFORM 12 (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu
/assets/Confronting-Crim-Justice-Debt-Guide-to-Policy-Reform-FINAL.pdf (“To
avoid creating incentives for courts and localities to fund themselves based on
criminal justice debt, the judicial system should be fully funded by the state.”).
4. PHYLLIS MCCLURE ET AL., CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, ENSURING
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: HOW LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
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districts are persistently underfunded relative to their highincome neighbors—despite those districts’ being tasked with
educating more students in need of additional support than
wealthier districts.5 In Pennsylvania, the highest poverty
school districts spend 33 percent less educating their children
than the wealthiest districts, entrenching opportunity
disparities across communities within the state.6 America is
thus one of only a handful of developed countries that allows
the economies of local areas to determine the quality of
schools in that area.7
The American system of public schools, funded by local
property taxes, was adopted by most states during the 19th
century—a time during which, among white colonialists,
“incomes were more equally distributed . . . than in any other
place that can be measured.”8 As a result, “this system of
using property taxes to pay for local schools did not [initially]
lead to much inequality.”9 But as economic inequality
increased, so did funding gaps between schools in rich and
FUNDING PRACTICES HURT DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND WHAT FEDERAL POLICY
CAN DO ABOUT IT, 1, (2008), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content
/uploads/issues/2008/06/pdf/comparability.pdf (“Nationwide, local school districts
account for about 50 percent of all public school operating costs.”).
5. See, e.g., Alana Semuels, Good School, Rich School; Bad School, Poor
School: The Inequality At The Heart Of America’s Education System, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2016) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08
/property-taxes-and-unequal-schools/497333/.
6. Press Release, Secretary Duncan, Urban League President Morial to
Spotlight States Where Education Funding Shortchanges Low-Income, Minority
Students, https://www.ed.gov/news/media-advisories/secretary-duncan-urbanleague-president-morial-spotlight-states-where-education-funding-shortchanges
-low-income -minority-students.
7. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 2013:
OECD INDICATORS, (2013), https://www.oecd.org/education/eag2013%20(eng)—
FINAL%2020%20June%202013.pdf.
8. PETER H. LINDERT & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, UNEQUAL GAINS: AMERICAN
GROWTH AND INEQUALITY SINCE 1700 (2016).
9. See Semuels, supra note 5 (“In 1890, property taxes accounted for 67.9
percent of public-education revenues in the U.S. This means that as America
urbanized and industrialized and experienced more regional inequality, so, too,
did the schools. Areas that had poorer families or less valuable land had less
money for schools.” (emphasis in original)).
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poor American communities.10 The size of district boundaries
mattered significantly: states that funded their school
systems at the local district level experienced greater
difficulty equalizing funding, compared to those that funded
districts at the (higher) county level.11 In an opinion
dissenting from the Court’s rejection of constitutional
challenge to this system, Justice Marshall observed that the
resulting scheme “arbitrarily channels educational resources
in accordance with the fortuity of the amount of taxable
wealth within each district.”12 As a result of this design,
“countless children unjustifiably receive inferior educations
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone.”13
These examples illustrate the relationship between
economic segregation and spatial constraints on
governments’ ability to provide public goods of a
redistributive nature. In this Essay, I develop a simple model
that illustrates the ways that economic inequality increases
the stakes of the boundary drawing exercise, with respect to
the possibilities for redistribution. I introduce the concept of
a “fiscal unit” to refer to the geographic scope of public
financing—which might be, depending on the program, a
school district boundary, a county, a state, or the entire
country. I show that where financial transfers across fiscal
units are limited—whether by political incentives or legal
structures or some other constraint—the existence of
enduring economic segregation places a ceiling on the policy
goal of redistribution. Thus, in order to achieve a policy of
effective redistribution, a political community facing high
levels of economic inequality must either (1) expand the
geographic scope of the fiscal unit such that it includes both

10. Id.
11. See id.
12. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 71–72 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)).
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the poor and the wealthy, or (2) transfer economic resources
across fiscal units.
Surprisingly, this relationship has not been explored in
the theoretical fiscal federalism literature. As described in
Part III infra, public finance scholars have theorized the
viability of local governments’ efforts to redistribute wealth
to be determined by residential mobility; they have largely
overlooked the importance of economic inequality and
resulting geographic concentrations of wealth.14 To inform
their assessments of where redistribution might properly
occur, public finance researchers have, to date, worked
backward from different assumptions about the mobility of
residents within the political community.15 Over decades,
something of a consensus had formed among public finance
scholars that high degrees of residential mobility will
undercut—indeed, make near impossible—localities’ efforts
to redistribute wealth. These orthodox models of
decentralization argued that location-mobility limits the
possibility of local redistribution because high-income people
will exit—and that residential mobility thus serves as a
disciplining measure for local governments. This view has
been criticized in recent years, on the grounds that residents
are not perfectly mobile, and thus—all else equal—local
governments can engage in some amount of redistribution
without risking the sort of “death spiral” predicted by
previous scholars.16
But both of these stories underemphasize—or altogether
overlook—the existing level of resource inequality within the
political community. This omission has limited the literature

14. See infra Part III for a discussion of how existing theoretical accounts
unduly emphasize mobility and while overlooking the importance of economic
inequality.
15. See id.
16. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances,
and Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057 (2007). See also infra Part III
for a discussion of how the public finance scholarship has considered the viability
of local governments’ efforts to redistribute wealth.
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in important ways and led to curious results. For example,
although the contours of the general framework have been
contested at the margins, over the years the literature has
generally coalesced around what Wallace Oates identified as
the “basic principle of fiscal decentralization: the
presumption that the provision of public services should be
located at the lowest level of government encompassing, in a
spatial sense, the relevant benefits and costs.” 17 This is
precisely the opposite recommendation as what results from
the framework I introduce, at least where economic
inequalities are pronounced.
Indeed, this framework demonstrates that we don’t have
to settle the empirical debate about location-mobility to
ascertain the implications of economic inequality for fiscal
federalism design. I show that in the presence of economic
segregation, narrowly-drawn fiscal units will decrease the
share of the population that is able to access the wealth held
by the “superearners” (as my model terms the wealthiest
few). For instance, district lines prevent taxes assessed from
wealthy homeowners in Chester County, Pennsylvania, from
funding school systems educating poor students in
neighboring Philadelphia (the highest-poverty large city in
America).18 I show that the case for centralizing mechanisms
of revenue collection is strong, given the current distribution
of economic resources across fiscal units. Additionally, I
demonstrate that this recommendation is not contingent on
any given level of mobility within a system.
This finding is relevant today. Over the past several
decades, income gains have accrued disproportionately to a

17. Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120,
1122 (1999); see also id. at 1120 (defining fiscal federalism as concerning itself
with “understand[ing] which functions and instruments are best centralized and
which are best placed in the sphere of decentralized levels of government”).
18. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PHILADELPHIA’S POOR 1 (2017),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2017/11/pri_philadelphias_poor.pdf
(“Poverty is one of Philadelphia’s most enduring problems. At 25.7 percent, the
poverty rate is the highest among the nation’s 10 largest cities.”).
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small number of extremely high-income individuals.19 Today,
the richest 0.1 percent of Americans hold 22 percent of the
country’s wealth—the same share held by the bottom 90
percent of the population—a level not seen since the 1920s.20
Indeed, few trends have received greater attention both in
legal and economics literature as well as in our political
discourse.21 But these two literatures—on the proper
assignment of redistribution in a federalist system and the
implications of rising economic inequality—have developed
separately, and not often been connected. This Essay
attempts to help close that gap.
Public finance scholars have recognized that we should
respond to rising income inequality by shifting the relative
burden of taxation upward, through higher rates on
superearners.22 This article suggests that this response is
insufficient, provided that policymakers do not also shift the
site of redistributive taxation. In particular, in order to
achieve an efficient and equitable allocation of public goods,
policymakers should respond to rising income inequality by
shifting the site of taxation to higher levels of government.

19. For a review of these trends, see CHAD STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO STATISTICS ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME
INEQUALITY, (2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-2811pov_1.pdf (showing that households in the middle and lower parts of the
income distribution have seen their income growth slow sharply, while incomes
at the very top have experienced sharp growth).
20. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United
States Since 1913: Evidence From Capitalized Income Tax Data 131 QUARTERLY
J. ECON., 519, 520–21 (2016).
21. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks on the
Economy (Dec. 4, 2013), in WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/running-transcript-president-obamas-december-4-remarks-on-the-economy/201
3/12/04/7cec31ba-5cff-11e3-be07-006c776266ed_story.html?utm_term=.3362a0a
77d6d (last visited May 22, 2019) (referring to economic inequality as “the
defining challenge of our time”).
22. See, e.g., Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Labor Income
Taxation, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 391 (Alan J. Auerbach et al., eds.
2013) (postulating that “for a given profile of social welfare weights . . . the higher
the pre-tax inequality . . . the higher the optimal tax rate.”).
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II. A BASIC MODEL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM
By definition, one consequence of economic inequality is
that an increasing share of the country’s wealth is held by a
small group of people, at the top of the income scale—a
greater concentration of wealth among people. As inequality
increases within a community, a greater share of its total
economic resources will be held by a given share of its
members. No logic is required to reach this result; it simply
is one definition of inequality. Figure 1 presents a visual
representation of this relationship.
FIGURE 1.

The Spatial Dimension of Economic Inequality*

*Figure 1 is a graphical representation of outputs generated from a
simple model of different distributions of wealth across an economy. As
noted in the text, the size of the circles (the geometric area) corresponds
to the amount of wealth held by representative households. The model
and respective outputs are on file with the author.
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In this Figure, as well as the others in this section, the
size of the circles represents the amount of wealth held by
members of the political community. I have plotted these
figures such that the total wealth in the community (the
summed area across all the circles) is held constant
throughout all examples at 1,500 units, but wealth
concentration varies across the twenty members of this
community. I calculated the size of the different circles to
match the levels of wealth concentration corresponding to
various Gini coefficients, the most common measure of
inequality.23
A. Rising Inequality Results in a Higher Geographic
Concentration of Wealth
Figure 1 visually depicts what happens as wealth
becomes increasingly concentrated—moving here from
perfect equality, to the level of actual concentration of 2013
market incomes in the U.S.24, to an illustrative extreme level
of inequality. In the “extreme inequality” scenario, used
throughout this section, a single “superearner”—one of
twenty in the community, and thus the top 5 percent—holds
90 percent of total wealth for comparison, the top 10 percent
of Americans held 77 percent of the country’s wealth in 2012,
according to estimates by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel
Zucman.25
The advantage of this visual representation is that it
shows the spatial dimension of economic inequality.
Whatever other effects inequality might have on a political
community, it is clear—indeed, it is mathematically true—
that one consequence of rising inequality is a geographic

23. See generally Robert Dorfman, A Formula for the Gini Coefficent, 61 REV.
ECON & STAT.146 (1979).
24. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND
FEDERAL TAXES, 2013 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114thcongress-2015-2016/reports/51361-householdincomefedtaxes.pdf.
25. Saez & Zucman, supra note 20, at 520–21.
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concentration of wealth.26 This relationship was recently
noted by sociologist Robert Manduca: “Because people live in
places, and because people are distributed unevenly across
places with respect to income or any other social
characteristic, changes in the distribution of income among
people will necessarily change the distribution of income
across places.”27 This insight has public finance implications,
for one simple reason: at least with respect to income taxes,
people are indivisible—each dollar they earn is generally
subject to income taxation only once per level of government,
based on location at a moment in time (either of the income
source or geographic domicile).28 Although these
superearners’ consumption choices are not bound to a
specific geographic area—and the cumulative economic
effects of inequality are thus uncertain with respect to
geography (though certainly biased in the direction of
concentration)—it is possible to make a clear statement
about the spatial dimension of economic inequality for the
purpose of person-based taxation. Rising economic inequality
necessarily results in a higher degree of geographic
clustering of fiscal resources, particularly as assessed
through person-based taxes.
The implications of this simple observation are
particularly notable in light of recent economic trends. After
all, these extremely wealthy individuals are mostly located
in a handful of locations, rather than distributed across the
country—and thus are outside the reach for many local
jurisdictions in an inevitable geographic sense. Further,
26. As explained below, this is different from economic segregation, which
follows from wealth concentration only under certain mobility assumptions.
27. Robert Manduca, The Contribution of National Income Inequality to
Regional Economic Divergence, 97 SOC. FORCES 1, 7 (2019).
28. Although this is true as a matter of aspirational tax policy (so as to avoid
taxing the same income multiple times), jurisdictions take different approaches
to taxing different types of income, and the legal reality can be somewhat more
complicated. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Defining Residence for Income Tax
Purposes: Domicile as Gap-Filler, Citizenship as Proxy and Gap-Filler, 38 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 271 (2017).
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these superearners are perceived by policymakers to be
highly mobile, and thus difficult for state and especially local
governments to tax—meaning that their wealth stands
outside these governments’ reach in an important practical
sense.29 Their perceived potential flight risk makes it more
“expensive” for local and state governments, compared to the
federal government, to raise from them a given dollar in
revenue.30
B. Defining the Fiscal Unit
The presence of fiscal boundaries introduces a new layer
to this story. Most state expenditures involve some element
of what we can describe as redistribution: instances of state
spending where the group of individuals who pay for the good
or service does not entirely and exhaustively overlap with the
user group. Where a state endeavors to pay for a publicly
provided good or service, the group of individuals from whom
these revenues are collected can be thought of as constituting
the “fiscal unit” for that category of spending. Fiscal units, as
I use the term here, are thus defined in reference to the
financers rather than the users of the good, in the cases
where redistribution occurs and those two groups are
distinct.
Although there are many ways for a state to limit this
universe of financers, the scope of a fiscal unit can always be

29. See, e.g., Charles Varner & Cristobal Young, Millionaire Migration in
California: The Impact of Top Rates, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 255 (2011); Enrico Moretti
& Daniel Wilson, The Effect of State Taxes on the Geographical Location of Top
Earners: The Case of Star Scientists, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 1858, (2017). But see
Cristobal Young et al., Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the Elite: Evidence
from Administrative Data, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 421 (2016), (concluding, based on a
review of tax returns for all million-dollar earners nationwide over 13 years, that
“Millionaire tax flight is occurring, but only at the margins of statistical and
socioeconomic significance”).
30. This is because residential mobility effectively increases the elasticity of
reported taxable income, and thus also the economic “cost” of raising taxes. Cf.
Jon Gruber and Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and
Implications, 84 J. PUB. ECON., 1, 22 (2002).
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defined in reference to some geographic boundary—typically
coincident to some political community (eligible residents of
a particular unit of government).31 These political
communities tend to overlap in concentric circles, where
higher levels of government share a common geography with
multiple smaller, subsidiary units. Theories of fiscal
federalism—which typically are discussed in terms of level of
government—can therefore also be thought of as arguments
about how broad, in a spatial sense (and more precisely, in
terms of population size), fiscal units should be defined.32
It is important to note here that although this analysis
focuses on the spatial component of inequality, the size of
these “fiscal units” is defined not in reference to landmass,
but rather to the number of people occupying the space. A
“small” fiscal unit may be quite large in terms of geography,
if its vast space includes only few people. This highlights one
key analytic advantage of using the fiscal unit as our mode
of analysis: under a traditional consideration of federalism,
South Dakota (population 850,000) occupies a level higher
than Los Angeles (3,900,000) and equal to California
(39,000,000). In this model, by contrast, the fiscal units
would be arranged in reference to population size within a
geographic space, rather than to the size of the landmass.
Accordingly, it may be the case—supported by the theory laid
out here—that the city of Los Angeles is better able to
support redistributive functions than the state of South
Dakota. Unlike other models of federalism, the units in this
model are defined in reference to the size of governed
populations—rather than to the level of government in a
political sense, or to the size of the geographic landmass.
31. That is, a state may limit the universe of financers by, for example,
assessing taxes only on a certain type of income or property—but these categories
will always be defined relative to some geographic boundary.
32. Others have drawn a similar distinction between the level of government.
See Zachary D. Liscow, The Efficiency of Equity in Local Government Finance, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1828, 1837 n.34 (2017) (“These other critiques have tended to focus
not on what level of government should pay for local services but rather the size
of the jurisdiction that should spend the money and regulate local affairs.”).
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One analytic contribution of this framework is thus to
shift away from centralization debate, which refers to the
proper level of government at which functions should be
provided and paid for, and towards the size of the fiscal unit.
This will often map onto centralization, because states will
tend to be larger than local governments (both of which will
always be smaller than the federal government)—but the
two measures are not the same. This has two additional
benefits for the purpose of this discussion. As described
further below, defining the fiscal unit this way anticipates
and accounts for an important objection: if the fiscal unit is
defined with respect to landmass, then geographic mobility
adds a new variable that must be accounted for. This
definition allows us to discuss the size of fiscal boundaries
without considering mobility, since residential exit and entry
will—on its own—change the size of the fiscal unit. Second,
the distinction between geography and population size
allows for a more productive discussion because it allows you
to draw conclusions, and make policy recommendations,
without getting lost in some of the ancillary federalism
debates that are less relevant here.
C. Geographic Wealth Concentration Increases the Stakes of
Fiscal Boundaries
In the absence of perfect mobility, greater economic
concentration across physical spaces necessarily follows from
rising income concentration. Where economic resources are
unevenly distributed across geography, the spatial definition
of fiscal units takes on greater significance. To the extent
that financial transfers across fiscal units are limited—
whether by political incentives or legal structures or some
other constraint—the existence of enduring economic
segregation places a ceiling on the policy goal of
redistribution. In the presence of economic segregation,
drawing fiscal units narrowly will decrease the share of the
population that is able to access the wealth held by the
superearners. And when economic inequality is rising, that
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wealth will constitute a growing share of the polity’s total
resources. Economic inequality thus raises the stakes of
“fiscal splintering” for redistributive outcomes and
possibilities.
This can be seen in Figure 2, which takes two of the
wealth distributions presented in Figure 1 and introduces
illustrative fiscal boundaries. The two scenarios in this
Figure represent the extremes of wealth distribution: where
wealth is distributed equally across members of the political
community, and where it is highly concentrated at the top
(represented here by a single superearner).
In communities where wealth is equally distributed, it
makes little difference for the purposes of redistribution how
many “fiscal units” are drawn, or how you draw those lines.33
The Figure varies the population size across the four fiscal
units, but—on a per capita basis—each community has the
same resources, even though total wealth in the communities
changes. Here, the redistributive stakes of the boundary
drawing exercise are low.34 But in the second scenario, where
there is extreme inequality, the size and boundaries of the
fiscal unit matter tremendously. Ninety-three percent of
wealth in the political community is held by the 30 percent
of the population that resides in Unit A; absent inter-unit
transfers, the 70 percent of community members (in Units B,
C, and D) must fund their public goods from the remaining 7
percent of economic resources.
The population that continues to live in the remaining,
33. This sets aside the reality that many redistributive public goods
(especially those taking forms other than pure cash transfers) involve economies
of scale or fixed costs. Schools are a classic example of this sort of mixed public
good; local court systems are another. Where scale matters, then the size of the
fiscal unit will have consequences even in the world where economic resources
are distributed equally across community members. As Zachary Liscow has
pointed out, this argument pertains more to centralized spending rather than
centralized funding. See id. at 1830 n.3.
34. Of course, the fact that wealth is equally distributed on a market basis
defeats the policy purpose for purely redistributive programs, but this basic
dynamic holds true also where slight wealth variations are introduced.
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resource-poor fiscal units will be unable to access the
superearners’ wealth for inter-unit redistribution. If the
dimensions of the polity’s fiscal units do not correspondingly
expand, then this sort of fiscal enclaving will thus have the
effect of shrinking the share of total resources available to
fund government functions serving those who does not cooccupy one of the resource-rich units. Absent inter-unit
transfers, it follows that the population that lives in the “left
behind” jurisdictions will be made worse-off (in an economic
sense) by fiscal splintering. Indeed, in this extreme example,
redistribution to these left behind community members is
impossible without some centrally coordinated transfer of
financial resources across fiscal units. As inequality rises,
the world necessarily will look more like the second scenario.
FIGURE 2.

Economic Inequality Raises the Stakes of Fiscal
Boundaries*,a

*Figure 2 is a graphical representation of outputs generated by the model
utilized for Figure 1 above. The model and outputs are on file with the author.
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aGraphical

representation of wealth in a system of: 1) perfect equality wherein
each of the twenty circles represents 75 units for a total of 1,500 wealth units,
and 2) extreme inequality wherein each of the nineteen small circle represents
8 units and the large circle represents 1,348 units, for a total of 1,500 wealth
units.

D. Effect on different groups
The effect of fiscal boundaries here varies across
members of the community, depending on whether they cooccupy the fiscal unit with the superearner. Indeed, it is
worth noting that—so long as the total amount of
redistribution is held constant—fiscal splintering creates
winners as well as losers. The poor families who live in the
same fiscal unit as the superearners (Unit A in this model)
now may enjoy the benefit of these resources without sharing
with those other poor families who remain outside the unit.
The effect of this is to increase their incomes, post tax and
transfers, to above the level that it would be absent either
redistribution or fiscal boundaries.
The departing fortunes of these two groups of poor
community members—introduced by the fiscal boundaries
(and based on proximity to the superearner)—highlights an
additional notable relationship. This framework establishes
that, where economic segregation is present, drawing
subnational fiscal boundaries limits the possibilities of
redistribution (absent inter-unit transfers). Figure 3
highlights an important conclusion: the presence of fiscal
boundaries will tend to result in greater inequality after
transfers, compared to a world where the fiscal unit is
maximally large and redistribution is undertaken centrally.
Where initial fiscal resources are unequally distributed
across a political community, fiscal boundaries will have the
effect of limiting redistribution; over time, this will have the
effect of increasing inequality compared to a world where
redistribution occurs centrally. Stated differently: as long as
there are some individuals who are “walled-off” from the
wealth of the superearners (which will be true so long as
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mobility is anywhere short of perfect, as described below),
and the total level of redistribution is held constant, then
narrowly-drawn fiscal units have the effect of increasing
after-transfer inequality. This is illustrated in Figure 3,
which shows the effect of fiscal boundaries on three different
conceptual categories of community members: the
superearners (described above, and shown in black); the
“hangers-on” (the poor members who co-occupy Unit A with
the superearner and may thus receive benefits financed by
their wealth, in dark gray); and the “left-behinds” (the poor
members in the remaining fiscal units, in light gray).
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Effect of Fiscal Boundaries on Different Groups
Amid Conditions of High Inequality

*Figure 3 is a graphical representation of outputs generated from the model utilized
for Figures 1 and 2 above. The model and outputs are on file with the author.
aWealth (area) of Left-Behinds: 8 (light gray); Hangers-On: 8 (gray); Superearners:
1,348 (Black). Gini coefficient: 0.85.
bWealth (area) of Left-Behinds: 8 (light gray); Hangers-On: 142 (gray);
Superearners: 946 (Black). Gini coefficient: 0.80.
cWealth (area) of Left-Behinds: 35 (light gray); Hangers-On: 35 (gray);
Superearners: 839 (Black). Gini coefficient: 0.51

To produce this Figure, I introduce a simple tax and
transfer system to the extreme inequality scenario described
above. Specifically, I set a flat tax—assessed on every
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member in the political community, without regard to their
fiscal unit—at 40 percent of economic resources. The entirety
of the collected is then redistributed back to members in the
form of a flat lump sum payment (akin to a universal basic
income), the amount of which is calculated so as to be equal
across members of the fiscal unit. I then recalculate wealth,
inclusive of these taxes and transfers. Stated differently, the
model extracts a flat-rate tax from every member in the
political community, but the proceeds are collected and
redistributed within the boundaries of the different fiscal
units.35
The first scenario shows the market distribution of
income, prior to tax and transfers; the next two scenarios
show the effect of the redistributive tax and transfer system
with and without centralized redistribution, achieved here
through inter-unit transfers. Because eligibility for the
transfer payments is determined centrally, the effect of the
inter-unit transfers is identical to a scenario where a single
fiscal unit is drawn to include the entire political community.
Provided that the total amount of redistribution is held
constant and the entirety of the resource is distributed
without respect to unit domicile, then—at least
economically—the effect is equivalent to expanding the fiscal
boundary, since you are able to achieve the same
redistribution.36 Held constant in this model are total
wealth, the total amount of redistribution (determined by the
tax rate), and residential location (perfect absence of
mobility).37
35. In this model, the government operates a purely redistributive cash
transfer system, involving no economies of scale. The focus here so far has been
on pure cash transfers, as they are conceptually easiest to conceive and also most
straightforward to show in a model. Introducing impure or fixed cost public goods
would change the numbers, but not the direction of the relationship.
36. Indeed, this is Liscow’s primary policy recommendation. See Liscow,
supra note 32, at 1897 (“[T]his Article’s most direct policy implication is that it
strengthens on efficiency grounds the case for more centralized funding of the
costs of providing services in poor localities.”).
37. Mobility is discussed further below, but it is worth noting here that under
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As shown in Figure 3, the presence of fiscal boundaries
significantly limits the effectiveness of the government’s
redistributive policy. Where the redistribution scheme is
centralized (here through inter-unit transfers to Units B, C,
and D), the Gini coefficient falls from 0.85 to 0.51—a 40
percent reduction. Where redistribution occurs only within
the different fiscal units, the Gini coefficient falls only 6
percent, to 0.8. Both the superearners and the hangers-on do
better in this scenario. The hangers-on receive significantly
higher transfers, and therefore come out much further ahead
after redistribution; although in both scenarios the
superearners pay more in taxes than they receive back in
benefits, they also receive higher transfers and are thus
better off when redistribution is localized. But the leftbehinds, who make up 80 percent of the total population, are
significantly worse off without the inter-unit transfers. The
effect of fiscal boundaries here is to reduce the redistributive
transfers to the left-behinds and increase the transfers to the
hangers-on. The effect of this is to dull the impact of the
redistributive program and increase total inequality,
compared to a world where redistribution is carried out
centrally. This is true even though there are winners and
losers, even among the non-superearners.
This basic dynamic has been observed before. Forty
years ago, Richard Musgrave noted that geographic
inequality would tend to have this effect over time: “The fact
that High Town has a higher average income than Low Town
means that local provision of social goods will tend to
increase inequality among the total population, including
residents of both towns.”38 Political scientist George Tsebelis
made a similar observation, arguing that “federalism is
likely [to] increase inequalities [because] some transfer
the traditional models of fiscal federalism introduced above, the case for local
redistribution is strongest where—as here, under the assumptions of this model—
citizens do not move in response to varying redistributive outcomes.
38. Richard A. Musgrave, Economics of Fiscal Federalism, 10 NEB. J. ECON &
BUS. 3, 8 (1971).

428

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

payments are restricted within states . . . [and so where] the
federation includes rich and poor states, transfers from the
former to the latter are reduced compared to a unitary
state.”39
Moreover, as explained below, it has been widely
observed that a primary implication of our decentralized
school finance structure is to codify, and perhaps reinforce,
existing economic inequalities across local school districts.40
Although this dynamic has been recognized in the context of
public education, this relationship—between static economic
segregation and the proper assignment of redistribution in
federalist systems—has been under-theorized. In particular,
while the public finance literature has extensively covered
the relationship between mobility and redistributive
assignment, the implications of rising inequality have
received considerably less attention.41 And although local
school systems may be the most obvious example, this
framework demonstrates there is no reason to believe that
the basic dynamic or relationship is not present wherever
state or local governments endeavor to provide redistributive
public goods.
III. EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF FISCAL FEDERAL UNDULY
EMPHASIZE MOBILITY WHILE IGNORING INEQUALITY
Public finance scholars have long debated the degree to
which government services—and the mechanisms of
collecting revenue to finance those services—should be

39. GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 89
(2002). See also, Jason Sorens, Does Fiscal Federalism Promote Regional
Inequality? An Empirical Analysis of the OECD, 1980–2005, 48 REGIONAL STUD.
239, 240 (2014) (“Some public finance economists argue that [preexisting]
inequalities widen over time in fiscally federal systems, as rich regions can
provide more public goods at lower cost per unit of income than poorer regions.”).
40. See generally Liscow, supra note 32.
41. Liscow is an important exception. See id. at 1837–38 (discussing the
implications of rising income inequality, and in particular differences in wealth
between cities and suburbs, for local school finances).
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centralized within and across political systems. To inform
their assessments of where redistribution properly should
occur, public finance researchers have to date worked
backwards from different assumptions about the mobility of
residents within the political community. But these
theoretical arguments, recounted in this section, have
largely sidestepped questions about what level of
centralization is optimal for redistributive programs—and
have focused on empirical questions about residents’
location-mobility and responsiveness to redistribution.
Researchers have worked backwards from different mobility
assumptions to inform their assessments of where
redistribution properly should occur—largely ignoring the
dynamics described in the above framework.
This Section recounts those debates, and shows that
those discussions are incomplete without reference to the
degree of economic concentration within the community.
This omission is no small matter, because the leading
principle of fiscal federal embodies the opposite
recommendation of what results from the above framework
that centers inequality. Even though scholars have focused
on mobility, I show that the dynamic presents itself so long
as citizens exhibit anything short of perfect mobility (and
perfect responsiveness to redistributive policy).
A. The Long Shadow of Charles Tiebout
Like so many debates in the fiscal federalism literature,
the dividing lines in this one can be traced back to Charles
Tiebout’s famous theory of location decisions and public
services.42 His model has provided normative justification for
two relevant policy recommendations. First, its logic
supports a policy of dividing political jurisdictions into

42. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956) (arguing that, under certain assumptions, people’s choice of
residences could function as a way of choosing among public goods, akin to the
way the market allows them to choose among private goods).
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numerous—and therefore, at least on average, small—local
governments, to ensure this marketplace of governments
from which citizen-consumers might choose is sufficiently
large.43 Second, Tiebout’s analysis has been used to argue for
entrusting these many local governments with significant
authority over the provision of public goods, to ensure that
the choices provided this large marketplace are sufficiently
diverse. Together, these recommendations support a general
policy of decentralized service provision—at least with
respect to the class of goods and services to which Tiebout’s
logic can be cleanly applied.44
But how broad should this category of goods be defined?
Wherever the state provides a good or service to the public
that incurs a budgetary cost, it must raise revenue to finance
the expense, either concurrently or in the future.45 Some
state-provided goods and services are financed through a
user-fee model, where the individual who pays for an
unsubsidized good is also its exclusive user. But the
overwhelming bulk of a state’s budget items involve some
element of redistribution, in the broadest sense of the term:
state spending where the group of individuals who pay for
the good or service do not entirely and exhaustively overlap
with the user group. For many public expenditures, namely

43. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, U. ILL. L.
REV. 1507, 1508–09 (2010) (“The normative takeaway from the Tiebout model
literature is clear: metropolitan regions should be divided into many local
governments that are free to provide local public services in an unrestricted way,
as this will ensure that mobile citizens receive their desired package of public
services.”).
44. See Liscow, supra note 32, at 1836 (“The model’s supporters have
generally argued for decentralized provision of services, and its critics have
generally argued for more centralized provision.”); Oates, supra note 17, at 1124
(“I sense a widespread impression, suggested in some of the literature, that the
gains from decentralization have their source in the famous Tiebout model”).
45. Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You
Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 378 (2004) (“When a
local government decides to provide a service, improve or construct
infrastructure, or regulate private activity, the question of how to pay will
generally be an important consideration.”).
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cash transfer programs, achieving this redistribution is the
first-order goal; for other types of expenditures, including socalled “mixed” or “impure” public goods, any redistribution
that occurs is incident to other policy goals. But it
nevertheless does occur: incidence of the expenditure’s
benefits does not perfectly match the incidence of the
corresponding collected revenue.
Tiebout identified mobility, and the disciplining
pressures it created for cities, as the market-like mechanism
by which local public goods could be efficiently provided by
local governments. Although the assumptions underlying his
original model are widely recognized as rarely-encountered
simplifications, they are thought to most closely approximate
real-world dynamics with respect to the (narrow) class of
goods that can be funded and enjoyed by the same group of
residents.46 For this reason, scholars have often
distinguished in their assessments between different types
of public goods—in particular between purely “local” goods
and those that are fundamentally redistributive in nature.47
B. Assignment of Redistribution: The Orthodox View
Depending on empirical assumptions and normative
emphasis, economists have diverged somewhat on the proper
assignment of purely—or at least predominately—local
government functions.48 Perhaps more precisely, they have
46. Indeed, one of the key contributions of Tiebout’s model was to demonstrate
the existence of this class of “local public goods,” for which a mechanism could
exist whereby decentralized provision could result in a Pareto-efficient outcome.
Prior to the publication of his article, the public finance literature had generally
accepted that decentralized choice could not result in an efficient provision of
public goods. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36
REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 388 (1954).
47. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five
Years After Tiebout: A Perspective (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 954, 1982) https://www.nber.org/papers/w0954.pdf.
48. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal
Federalism, 12 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 349, 352 (2005) (“Decentralized levels of
government found their primary role in the provision of efficient levels of “local”
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tended to divide on the question of how broadly or narrowly
these categories should properly be defined—particularly
considering that, as noted, almost all government functions
provide some spillover benefits that are “uncaptured” by the
financing population, and thus some element of
redistribution.49
With respect to redistributive goods, something of a
consensus has emerged in the public finance literature: these
functions ought to be assigned to the central level of
government.50 In this literature, redistribution has been
public goods—that is, public goods whose consumption was limited primarily to
their own constituencies.”); Laura Levaggi & Rosella Levaggi, Devolution And
Grant-In-Aid Design For The Provision Of Impure Public Goods, 5 SPRINGERPLUS
1, 1 (2016) (“Traditional fiscal federalism theory postulates that devolution for
the provision of local public goods increases welfare. However, most of the
services offered at local level are local impure public goods whose characteristics
may prevent devolution from being efficient.”). But see, e.g., Barry R. Weingast,
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and
Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6 (1995) (arguing that service
decentralization, as a general policy, limits intrusive tendencies of the public
sector and supports the effective operation of private markets).
49. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 25–26 (1998)
(“[Cities] provide services—like police, fire, sanitation, and education—that not
only can be allocated to some people at the expense of others but often are. As a
result, the theory of public goods, when applied to local governments, largely
consists of arguments about whether, and to what extent, it is efficient for cities
to supply these kinds of ‘mixed’ or ‘impure’ public goods.”); Levaggi & Levaggi,
supra note 48, at 2 (“The traditional literature on fiscal federalism . . . argue[s]
that the allocation of functions between Central and local Governments should
follow efficiency principles. Production should be assigned to the tier which is
better informed on local preferences, while Central Government . . . may use
grants for equity and efficiency reasons.”); John R. Brooks, Fiscal Federalism as
Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role of Redistributive Taxation 68 TAX L. REV. 89,
110 (2014) (“Another key result of classic fiscal federalism theory is that local
public goods defined spatially . . . can be most efficiently provided by the
government whose political lines lie most close to the spatial dimension for the
local public good, all else equal.”); Oates, supra note 17, at 1121 (“Decentralized
levels of government have their raison d’etre in the provision of goods and services
whose consumption is limited to their own jurisdictions.”).
50. See Brooks, supra note 49, at 110 (“The standard view in the literature is
that redistribution . . . should be exclusively allocated to the most central level of
government—at the federal level, in the United States—with subnational
governments focusing more on allocation of public goods and raising revenue from
flatter and more stable taxes, such as a real property tax.”). See also Richard A.
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defined broadly—generally assuming some transfer across
income groups, but frequently emphasizing the spatial
components of the task.51 As John Brooks has described, this
theoretical consensus attaches to both the expenditure and
revenue side: “[R]edistribution, and the closely related
progressive income tax, should be assigned exclusively to the
most central level of government in a federal system, leaving
subnational governments to focus on allocation of public
goods, funded with taxes tied closely to benefits.”52
Indeed, this is frequently presented not as a policy
recommendation but rather as a sort of natural rule, based
on the implications of the same disciplining forces of mobility
and citizen-as-consumer behavior that Tiebout identified.53
The idea is that the mobility of economic units constrains
local governments in their attempts to redistribute income in
a way that does not similarly limit higher levels of
government.54 Should a local government attempt to provide
Musgrave, Economics of Fiscal Federalism, 10 NEB. J. ECON. & BUS. 3, 10 (1971)
(“Adjustments in the distribution of income should be the responsibility of central
policy, since it is only here that such measures can be conducted effectively and
without causing severe efficiency losses.”); Micheael Keen & David E. Wildasin,
Pareto Efficiency in International Taxation 15 (Ctr. For Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst.,
Working Paper No. 371, 2000) (arguing that under certain assumptions, it will
be Pareto-improving for the national authority to subsidize local redistribution).
But see David E. Wildasin, Locational Efficiency in a Federal System, 10
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 453, 461 (1980) (“[T]he demonstration that local tax
systems are not ideally efficient is not a demonstration of the need for central
government intervention—for example, in the form of inter-jurisdictional
equalizing grants, as suggested by numerous writers. For such intervention is
liable to introduce its own distortions and costs, and these must be weighted
against the defects of the existing system.”).
51. See Musgrave, supra note 50, at 4 (“The spatial incidence of social goods
differs. They may thus be arranged depending on whether their benefit incidence
is local, statewide, regional, or national.”).
52. Brooks, supra note 49, at 89.
53. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 417 (1956).
54. See Gillette, supra note 16, at 1059 (“Redistributive exactions, the theory
goes, should be the exclusive domain of more centralized jurisdictions—state and
federal governments—from which taxpayers cannot easily exit without
simultaneously giving up jobs, friends, or lifestyle.”).
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any significant support of low-income households, it is
theorized, this choice is likely to result in both 1) an influx of
poor residents seeking to avail themselves of the generous
benefits, risking the transformation of redistributive
localities into “welfare magnets,”55 and 2) an exodus of those
with higher incomes, who must then bear the corresponding
tax burden.56
In an early and influential formulation of this view,
James Buchanan described each resident of a metropolitan
area as representing some net value to his or her
community.57 The existence of local redistribution, he
argued, drives a wedge between residents’ contributions and
their “costs”: those that would pay more taxes than they
would use in services would have a positive net value, while
those with lower incomes and higher service needs would
have a net cost to their community.58
Buchanan predicted municipalities that did not make
focused efforts to retain profitable residents—and make

55. See id., at 1057, 1059 (describing and providing examples of this
literature).
56. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 49, at 111 (“States with significant
redistributive policies may become unattractive to higher-earning individuals
and correspondingly more attractive to lower-earning individuals. If taxpayers
are highly mobile within a nation, this could be costly to such a state, since the
state would prefer the reverse—to be attractive to high-earning individuals,
rather than low-earning individuals.”) Charles C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates,
Assistance To The Poor In A Federal System, 32 J. PUB. ECON. 307, 317 (1987)
(arguing that local redistribution will tend to attract poor from other jurisdictions
and thus increase the local price of redistribution).
57. James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUB. CHOICE
1, 13 (1971). See also Gillette, supra note 16, at 1070 (“[T]he underlying theory is
that local residents and firms can too easily escape redistributive burdens by
emigrating to localities that impose only benefit taxes. Emigrants are likely to be
the relatively wealthy, who bear a disproportionate share of the redistributive
burden and thus have incentives to find alternative residence. As they exit, the
redistributive burden falls increasingly on those who remain, heightening
incentives for them to emigrate as well. Simultaneously, the promise of
redistribution attracts more beneficiaries from outside the locality, creating
greater demand for the benefits of redistribution.”).
58. Buchanan, supra note 57, at4–5, 12.
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themselves unattractive to net service consumers—could
easily fall into something of a death spiral.59 They would
have to raise tax rates to pay for their service shortfalls,
thereby driving away the mobile net taxpayers; this exodus
would aggravate the fiscal shortfall and force further tax
hikes, in turn driving away still more higher-income
residents.60 As Michelle Wilde Anderson has documented,
there are many examples of this dynamic playing out much
as predicted in recent decades.61 Where core cities or older
suburbs continued to have disproportionate low-income
populations, the gap between service costs and available
revenues has often to a vicious cycle of ever-greater service
cuts followed by further out-migrations and revenue
deterioration requiring further service cuts.
Even those who have not gone so far prescriptively have
generally argued that mobility of individuals with higher
income makes significant redistribution at the local level
difficult—or even impossible—to achieve, at least as a
practical matter.62 The strong version of this argument is
summarized by Clayton Gillette:
The basis of that orthodoxy, derived from standard theories of fiscal
federalism and urban economics, is straightforward: Local
governments cannot successfully or efficiently redistribute wealth.
That conclusion is predicated on a simple and compelling premise.
Residents and firms that bear the burden of local redistribution can
too easily exit to neighboring jurisdictions that impose only benefitbased taxes of the sort that underwrite goods and services for
taxpayers themselves. Mobile residents who escape redistributive
taxes impose a greater redistributive burden on those who remain,
inducing them to follow suit in a continuing downward spiral.63

An early form of this absolute conclusion is provided by

59. See id. at 1, 12, 14.
60. See id. at 4–5.
61. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J.
1118, 1145–48 (2014).
62. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 189–204 (2003).
63. Gillette, supra note 16, at 1058 (emphasis added).
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Musgrave, who argued—based on the implications of
residential mobility—that “[p]olicies to adjust the
distribution of income among individuals must be conducted
on a nationwide basis.”64 Richard Briffault has argued that
local financial control may have the effect of reinforcing the
consequences of initial inequalities across regions by
creating a “centrifugal force,” due to the sort of competitive
pressures described by Buchanan.65
The development of this orthodoxy can be observed in the
debate within the economics literature. In an early
contribution, Mark Pauly argued that the assignment of
redistribution to the local level allows polities to vary levels
of redistribution across regions, and thus—where political
preferences for redistribution vary across geographies—can
promote efficiency.66 His work called for redistribution to be
carried out at the local level wherever local governments are
better able to express these diverse preferences for
redistribution, which could occur under his model. This
result can be thought of as one application of the general
principle Oates identified, which Gillette also uses to support
his argument for local redistribution.67 But economists
64. Musgrave, supra note 50 at 7. See also id. (“Progressive income taxation
at the upper as well as transfers at the lower end of the scale—if substantial in
scope—must be uniform within the entire area over which there is a high degree
of capital and labor mobility, which means they have to be a function of the
national government.”).
65. Specifically, he predicts efforts by the affluent to physically segregate
themselves from the less affluent, to deploy local land use powers to heighten the
barriers to local economic integration, and to incorporate separately so as to
protect their local wealth and immunize local taxpayers from regional fiscal
needs and demands. See Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School
Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 773, 805–06 (1992).
66. See Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J.
PUB. ECON. 35, 36–37 (1973).
67. See Oates, supra note 17, at 1122 (“The efficient level of output of a ‘local’
public good . . . is likely to vary across jurisdictions as a result of both differences
in preferences and cost differentials. To maximize overall social welfare thus
requires that local outputs vary accordingly.”); Gillette, supra note 16, at 1065
(“If . . . preferences for redistribution are heterogeneous, local programs would
allow a larger number of individuals to satisfy their preferences for a specific level
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Burbidge and Meyers later argued that, once certain of
Pauly’s assumptions are relaxed, diverse preferences for
redistribution may lead to unequal residence-based taxation
and thus actually undermine economic efficiency—that “the
price of local expression of diverse preferences for
redistribution may be inefficiency.”68
A number of scholars have identified practical or political
considerations—for example, the implications of legal
structures that exist at the state and local level, including
balanced budget requirements and constitutional tax and
expenditure limitations—that function as additional
constraints on local governments’ ability to redistribute
effectively.69 Still others have rejected Tiebout’s analytic
framework on normative grounds, arguing that local
governments should advance democratic values by
accommodating citizens’ need “to participate actively in the
basic societal decisions that affect one’s life.”70
C. Assignment of Redistribution: Recent Reconsiderations
But the shadow of Tiebout remains long in this
literature, both descriptively and for its normative
implications. Against this backdrop, several legal scholars
have pointed out that—despite theoretical arguments
predicting that redistribution can take place only centrally—
of redistribution.”).
68. John B. Burbidge & Gordon M. Myers, Redistribution Within and Across
the Regions of a Federation, 27 CANADIAN J. ECON. 620, 629 (1994). Their model
focuses in particular on the labor mobility assumption. (Pauly’s model, like
Tiebot’s, had made the simplifying assumption that individuals do not work.)
69. Brooks, supra note 49, at 105–07 (discussing the implications of state
fiscal institutions including balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure
limitations, and rainy-day funds); See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544 (2005) (highlighting various structural biases
in state constitutional structures and arguing, among other things, that states
should revise their fiscal constitutions to take account of recessions).
70. Gerald E. Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1068
(1980). See also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 399–435 (1990).
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local governments are, in practice, able to achieve a
significant amount of redistribution.71
Because these arguments stand out within the local
government literature as important exceptions from the
consensus that municipalities are unable to effectively
achieve redistribution, it is worth noting here what leads
these authors to their unorthodox conclusions. As described
above, much of the case that has been made for centralization
hinges on the presumed or asserted impossibility of local
redistribution. That is, the theoretical arguments have not
generally been made in reference to any particular benefit of
centralization on its own terms—but rather as something of
a default, given the combination of 1) an observed political
desire to achieve redistribution, and 2) the constraints placed
on local governments by mobile residents.
Gillette pushes back against the orthodoxy he
summarizes by identifying several reasons why
redistribution has, for some time, been “a staple of local
government.”72 The asserted effect of each reason he
discusses is to dull, in some way, the market-like forces of
citizen mobility that Buchanan and others had identified.73
For example, he discusses the ways that agglomeration
economies—economic returns available by virtue of
geographic proximity to others—might constrain the location
decisions of both firms and residents, such that their
responsiveness to imposed tax extractions might fall
somewhere short of perfect.74 He notes that members of a
71. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text for a discussion on
presumed or asserted impossibility in local redistribution.
72. Gillette, supra note 16, at 1060 (noting that, according to 2001 Census
figures, about seven percent of all municipal direct expenditures went towards
unreimbursed direct expenditures for public welfare and health care).
73. See generally id.
74. Id. at 1057 (“The market for residence . . . will be distorted by the same
agglomeration economies that induce firms to remain within a particular
jurisdiction, notwithstanding that it would prefer that all those within its
network migrate to some alternative jurisdiction. Exit will only occur if the costs
related to exploitation exceed the significant costs related to emigration.”).
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community might plausibly support some level of “benign”
redistribution to others in their community, even in excess of
their own returns.75
Discussing the political dynamics of redistributive
policy, Gillette has also argued that local redistribution
“typically entails the transfer of relatively small amounts
from a large number of individuals to a smaller group of
beneficiaries, each of whom receives a significant benefit.”76
But as economic inequality rises, the nature of
redistribution—where it occurs at all—will tend to shift. To
the extent that wealth is concentrated among a few
superearners, the model Gillette describes, where the many
transfer to the poorer few, will no longer be available;
resources for redistribution will either come from the few
superearners or they will not be available.77
Another recent account, from John Brooks, makes a
similar argument, applied to tax policy.78 He discusses recent
empirical work showing that an individual’s mobility
response to local redistributive tax and spending policies is
often relatively muted, and varies across demographics and
other factors.79 From this result, he proposes separating the
insurance function of income taxation—the function of
smoothing receipts across the business cycle, which should
be retained by the central authority—from its redistributive
function, which he argues can safely be untaken by state
governments without risking taxpayer flight.80

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1065.
77. Id.
78. Brooks, supra note 49.
79. Id. at 90–91.
80. Id. at 142 (“The relevant costs, at least within the range of plausible
current policies, are not from tax migration and crippling state tax competition
as a result of redistributive policies, but rather from poor risk management—
suboptimal insurance against income shocks, both for states and their
residents.”).
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Notably, both of these authors ground their arguments
in the existence of mobility constraints—the various reasons
why residential mobility is something short of perfect—
which supports their findings that local redistribution can be
achieved. As generally theorized, the relationship is inverse:
as mobility increases (approaching perfect responsiveness),
the amount of redistribution that can be achieved at the local
level declines. Evidence that location decisions are highly
sensitive to benefit spillover undermines, in this model, the
case for local redistribution; evidence that location decisions
are determined by other factors makes local redistribution
more attractive.
As such, many of the arguments “against” centralized
redistribution have adopted the limited formulation that
redistribution can happen at the local level, rather than
making a positive case that this the preferable design.81
Support for this proposition, where it can be found, tends to
come not from the academic literature but from political
actors who take a dim view of redistribution as a policy goal.
For example, columnist David Brooks recently wrote that
“[c]onservatives tend to like their [income] redistribution
done at the local level”82 and many Republican policy
proposals—like converting entitlement programs into statelevel block grants—implicitly adopt this recommendation,
even where it is not argued in these terms.83

81. See Brooks, supra note 49, at 112 (“It may be that some limited state role
in redistribution—perhaps close to what states are currently doing—is
appropriate, and may even be optimal.”). But see Gillette, supra note 16, at 1121
(“The conventional wisdom that local redistributive programs will encourage exit
to localities that impose only benefit-based taxes . . . ignores the spatial benefits
of redistribution that may make local programs efficient and effective.”).
82. David Brooks, The G.O.P. Rejects Conservatism, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/opinion/the-gop-rejects-conservatis
m.html?ref=opinion&_r=0.
83. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, The Proglem with Block-granting
Entitlement Programs, CBPP.org, https://www.cbpp.org/the-problems-withblock-granting-entitlement-programs (last visited May 22, 2019).
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D. School Finance Equity
Throughout this theoretical literature, mobility is the
key variable that determines the availability of local
redistribution: as location decisions become more elastic with
respect to benefit spillover, the attractiveness of centralizing
redistribution increases. But in the applied literature, other
inputs have received greater attention. In particular,
scholarship on education in the United States has devoted
significant attention to the implications of resource
inequality across geographies.84 Indeed, perhaps the central
conclusion of the scholarship on school funding inequality is
that economic segregation leads to less redistribution and
the need for higher rates of taxation in poor towns.
Education is a classic example of the class of “impure”
public good described above, including elements of
redistribution as well as benefit to the financer. In the
United States, as noted above, primary schools are largely
financed by locally assessed property taxes—though with
significant redistributive inter-district transfers from the
higher levels of government, especially through the federal
government’s Title I program. Over the past several decades,
courts have made municipal boundaries crucial
determinants of the availability of education, even as they
have rejected challenges to the exclusion of low-income
people from many affluent communities.85 In that same

84. See Liscow, supra note 32, at 1837–38 (reviewing this literature and
noting that, in the local education context, “the dominant critique [of the Tiebout
model] has been the stark inequalities associated with decentralized funding”).
See also Reynolds, supra note 45, at 375 (“[T]he current legal system has made it
possible for affluent suburbs to capture wealth and impose costs on other parts
of metropolitan areas, most importantly through the exercise of zoning powers,
taxation powers, and school funding systems.”).
85. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (refusing to allow
federal court to order cross-district school desegregation remedy despite finding
of intentional discrimination by the state that chartered those suburbs); see also
San Antonio Indep. Schl. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 55–59 (1973) (rejecting
equal protection challenge to vast disparities in school financing based on local
property values).
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period, scholars and advocates have observed that
decentralized systems of education finance will tend to limit
the quality of education received in poor school districts,
despite the residents’ bearing a significantly greater tax
burden than their wealthier neighbors. On this basis, many
legal scholars have argued that the equal provision of
educational opportunity requires some form of fiscal
centralization.86
Some of this literature has discussed the sort of
competitive pressures deriving from residential mobility that
Tiebout and Buchanan identified.87 But scholars also have
recognized that the existence of economic segregation across
geographies raises the stakes of the centralization debate
even on a static basis. As Richard Briffault has observed,
“local financial control contributes to inequality in the
provision of local education . . . [by] dividing states into
districts of radically different taxable wealth, making the
quality of local services dependent upon the amount of local
wealth.”88 Notably, the local government literature has in
this context highlighted constraints on mobility—in
86. Liscow, supra note 32, at 1839 (“[C]entralization advocates argue that,
with a decentralized finance system, it is not the differences in tastes but rather
the differences in income that drive differences in spending between jurisdictions,
with severe consequences for inequality.”).
87. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 229–232
(2001); Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24
CONN. L. REV. 773, 805 (1992) (“In contemporary metropolitan areas, local
financial responsibility encourages residents dissatisfied with the quality of
education in their community to take the Tiebout solution and ‘exit’ to
communities with the resources and programs to provide the desired educational
services, rather than loyally remain in their old communities . . . .”); Isaac Bayoh
et al., Determinants of Residential Location Choice: How Important Are Local
Public Goods in Attracting Homeowners to Central City Locations, 46 J. REGIONAL
SCI. 97, 99 (2006).
88. Briffault, supra note 87, at 805–06 (“Local financial responsibility . . . both
reflects and contributes to interlocal wealth disparities by creating fiscal
incentives for the economic and political fragmentation of metropolitan areas,
[and] reducing the taxable resources of less affluent communities . . . .”); Liscow,
supra note 32, at 1830–31 (“When funding is decentralized, and local
communities pay for their own services, the wealth of the community becomes a
key determinant in how much a community can pay for services like schools.”).
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particular, successful efforts of affluent communities to
exclude low-income families with children—as justification
for greater centralization of this particular mixed public
good. This is remarkable, considering that the theoretical
case for redistributive centralization is frequently justified in
reference to the competitive pressures created by high
degrees of residential mobility. This inconsistency within the
leading accounts of fiscal federalism might naturally suggest
that models of fiscal federalism omit an important variable—
or at the very least overemphasize residential mobility—but
this tension has not previously been recognized.
IV. THE CENTRAL DYNAMICS OF THE MODEL ARE NOT
SENSITIVE TO DIFFERENT RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY
ASSUMPTIONS
Does mobility matter at all, then? Particularly given its
central role in previous models, it should be acknowledged
that all of the scenarios described in Part II assume away
mobility; the models are static, and the residents of this
political community do not respond to these changes in the
way that the literature predicts they will. In particular, this
analysis implicitly assumes the existence of some constraints
on the ability of poor people (the left-behinds) to simply move
to the resource-rich jurisdiction (Unit A). This is an
important limitation, because—as discussed above—in a
world without any constraints on their mobility, poor people
will naturally tend to move to the wealthier jurisdictions. To
the extent that this is true, it will provide a countervailing
pull on this theoretical relationship between inequality and
geographic segregation, and thus also between fiscal
splintering and redistribution. (Of course, as just described,
the fiscal federalism literature suggests that the case for
decentralizing redistribution becomes stronger as mobility
declines—but it should be noted here that this simplifying
assumption limits the model.) What are the consequences of
this simplification?
The most obvious objection concerns the left-behinds. I
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noted in the previous section that this group clearly loses
from fiscal splintering. The effect of economic inequality
means that a greater share of total resources will be located
outside of these left-behind districts. This is mathematically
true whether or not these individuals are concentrated
geographically, provided that fiscal units are drawn such
that some number of individuals is excluded from the
resource-rich jurisdictions.89 To the extent that the
superearners will seek to live near other similarly-wealthy
individuals, the effects will be magnified. If these
superearners are additionally able to exclude individuals
who have fewer financial resources—if they are able to
enforce their enclaving through political or practical
means—then the relationship will be stronger still.
But it may be argued that the number of these “leftbehind” residents will in practice likely be small, considering
that over time the poor are likely to migrate towards the
rich—such that the same geographic community will grow
larger as a fiscal unit, because it will include both poor and
rich. If the total amount of redistribution is held constant
across time, then this fiscal splintering also creates winners:
poor families who share a fiscal unit with the superearners
now may enjoy the benefit of these resources without sharing
with those other poor families who remain outside the unit.
Because people are mobile to some degree, we cannot
know with certainty how large the share of the population
that will remain in these categories is—that is an empirical
question that lies beyond the scope of this Essay. But there
are reasons to believe that constraints on mobility do exist,
and those constraints will limit the ability of the left-behinds
to simply move to the superearners’ fiscal unit. As long as
some number are left behind—and thus “walled off” from the
89. In the absence of perfect mobility, rising inequality leads to greater
economic segregation. This is true because even if every poor person were to
follow the superearners, the community would still have a geographic
concentration of wealth, and it would now also have a geographic concentration
of poverty. This simply describes a geographic concentration of people.
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superearners’ wealth—we can state with certainty that fiscal
splintering will tend to increase inequality postredistribution, as compared to a centralized regime.
Although the strength of this relationship (between economic
segregation and redistributive outcomes) will be affected by
a number of factors, this Essay shows that the direction of
this relationship does not require qualification.
It is true that, at the margin, poor people will tend to
migrate to cash-rich communities: this is a central conclusion
of the federalism literature, and there is some empirical
support for the proposition. Studies estimating migration
effects of welfare programs characterized by inter-state
benefit variation policies have ranged from finding no tax
migration effect at all to a comparatively high degree of
responsiveness.90 But even the studies finding the highest
degree of responsiveness—a result that, it should again be
noted, federalism scholars typically would consider evidence
for centralizing redistribution91—show that mobility is short
of perfect.
This is, in part, because poor families, like everyone else,
are attached to their communities for reasons separate from
the tax and transfer system. But beyond those factors,
wealthy communities have a variety of legal and practical

90. See Kathleen M. Day & Stanley L. Winer, Policy-Induced Internal
Migration: An Empirical Investigation of the Canadian Case, 13 INT’L TAX & PUB.
FIN. 535, 535–36 (2006) (finding, in over twenty years of Canadian tax data, little
migration based on interstate policy differences in the generosity of
unemployment insurance); Robert Kaestner, Neeraj Kaushal & Gregg Van Ryzin,
Migration Consequences of Welfare Reform, 53 J. URB. ECON. 357, 358–59 (2003);
Phillip B. Levine & David J. Zimmerman, An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare
Magnet Debate Using the NLSY, 12 J. POPULATION ECON. 391, 407 (1999). Others
have demonstrated empirically that local governments can use income taxes to
redistribute wealth without significant migration effects. See Timothy J.
Goodspeed, A Re-Examination of the Use of Ability to Pay Taxes by Local
Governments, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 319, 340 (1989).
91. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 49, at 112 (“If it is difficult for taxpayers to
move, and if there are factors that outweigh taxation (such as jobs, family,
culture, and the like), then states actually may have some room for redistribution
with little repercussion.”).
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tools that can be used to exclude.92 Even if the effect of these
measures is imperfect, they do have a real effect on
residential mobility; indeed, this is a central finding in the
thread of literature responding to Tiebout.93 David
Schleicher has shown that rates of inter-state mobility are
low particularly among disadvantaged groups, despite a
growing connection between moving and economic
opportunity.94 To the extent that people are unable to move,
for whatever reason, then some number will be unable to
escape their cash-poor communities for the greener pastures
of the wealthy fiscal units.
But even if no constraints on mobility existed and every
left-behind determined her residence via a single-variable
calculus that maximized redistributive transfers,95 this does
not undermine the existence of the relationship identified
here. Recall that I have defined the fiscal units in reference
to population size. Were all residents of the community to be
perfectly responsive to redistributive outcomes, this would
simply mean that, over the long run, fiscal units are always
maximally large—that they never vary in size at all, because
the poor will simply follow the superearners. That might be
true in a theoretical model that doesn’t include any
geographic “stickiness” (that is, under conditions of perfect
mobility and responsiveness), but we know that it does not
describe the real world. Under this extreme assumption, the
92. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 931, 935–41 (2010).
93. See Pierre Salmon, Horizontal Competition Among Governments, in
HANDBOOK OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 69 (Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio eds.,
2006) (“[The high cost of moving] is often considered a decisive objection to
models—like the Tiebout model or the Oates and Schwab model (1988)—that are
dependent on the assumption of mobility.”).
94. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential
Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 78 (2017) (“People are not leaving areas hit by
economic crises, with unemployment rates and low wages lingering in these areas
for decades. And people are not moving to rich regions where the highest wages
are available.”).
95. This is an admittedly extreme assumption, but it underlies many forms of
Tieboutian reasoning described above.
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most that can be said is that there is no relationship between
inequality and economic segregation—not that the
relationship goes the other way, but just that in practice it
will tend to be small.96
That is to say, the existence of mobility does not defeat
the argument that economic inequality is linked to
geospatial segregation—it merely reduces the strength of the
relationship. Even the strongest form of this argument is
that rising individual inequality does not necessarily lead to
rising inequality in geographic space—it just very likely does
so. But note what is required for this to not be true. It
requires that every single poor person follow the
superearners. If even one is left behind, then the relationship
is descriptively correct. In other words, this criticism in its
strongest form is about the strength rather than the existence
of this relationship.
That is, the central recommendation of the model holds
as long as mobility is not both perfect (every individual has
the ability to relocate, and no barriers are allowed), and
perfectly responsive to these changes (every individual
actually does relocate on this basis). We know that the world
does not look like this. In reality, the poor often face practical
boundaries to relocation; the rich have a variety of legal and
practical mechanisms that can be used to exclude, and even
perfectly mobile people will sometimes choose factors—like
proximity to family or the availability of work—that lead
them to reside in a community other than the one that would
maximize their potential receipt of redistribution or public
services.

96. Moreover, this counterargument is actually consistent with my broader
point. The only way to argue that this relationship is not true is to suggest that,
as a result of mobility, the fiscal unit will include both the superearners and all
of the poor. But the point of my argument is that we should ensure that this
happens. If this already is happening—and again, there is plenty of evidence that
it is not—then it does not undermine my argument, it simply limits its
applicability to cases where mobility is imperfect.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many have missed the deep implications of economic
inequality for core tenants of fiscal federalism. This
framework shows that debates about the proper assignment
of redistribution assume a different character depending on
the preexisting level of inequality within the political
community. Specifically, economic inequality raises the
stakes of “fiscal splintering” for redistributive outcomes and
possibilities: where economic resources are unevenly
distributed across geography, the spatial definition of fiscal
units takes on great significance. And the presence of
economic inequality places a ceiling on local governments’
ability to provide public goods or achieve redistribution,
absent centrally-coordinated fiscal transfers.
Traditional models of fiscal federalism overlook this
important relationship. Orthodox models of decentralization
argue that location-mobility of residents is a disciplining
measure for local governments. The consensus view is that
mobility limits the ability of local governments to achieve
redistribution, because high-income people will exit when it
is attempted.97 Others point to evidence showing that
locations decisions are relatively inelastic to support their
conclusion that redistribution can happen at the local level.98
I show that this debate does not need to be settled in order
to conclude that rising levels of economic inequality support
moving redistribution to higher levels of governance.
Just as scholars have argued that the competitive forces
of residential mobility have the effect of making local
redistribution impossible, these examples suggest that—on
a static basis—high levels of inequality will tend to have the
same effect. So as long as there are some constraints on
mobility, then it can be said—without qualification—that
rising inequality will always and necessarily have the effect
97. See discussion supra Section II.B.
98. See supra Section III.C.
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of increasing the geographic clustering of resources. This
follows mathematically from the fact that inequality is
defined as an increasing concentration of economic resources
across a population, and that people are indivisible economic
units—they exist at only one place in time. And to the extent
that economic resources are unevenly spread across a
political community, then the exercise of line drawing—of
determining the size and placement of the fiscal units—
becomes increasingly important as a determinant of the
practical availability of inter-unit economic redistribution.
For public finance scholars, the predominant policy
response to the trend of economic stratification has been to
increase the burden of taxation on very high-wealth
individuals.99 But as the model supporting this framework
demonstrates, the case for centralizing redistribution
depends in large part on the level of economic inequality in a
polity—and is thus greatly strengthened by rising
inequality. The significant implications of this basic
relationship have not been fully explored. Service devolution
to lower, smaller geographic units has been praised for
various virtues according to America’s favorite versions of
democratic theory.100 But under a set of straightforward
assumptions, these structures will also have the inevitable
effect of deepening inequality and making the efficient
provision of public services less likely. As a policy matter, it
suggests that we should focus on either increasing the size of
fiscal units of redistribution to include ultra-wealthy or
alternatively shifting the site of redistribution to the circle
that is large enough to include both the haves and the havenots.
99. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez, Income and Wealth Inequality: Evidence and
Policy Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 7, 7 (2017); Emmanuel Saez,
Questions and Answers: Income and Wealth Inequality—Evidence and Policy
Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 26, 26–28 (2017).
100. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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I argue here that on policy matters involving some
element of redistribution—that is, almost everything the
government does—fiscal decentralization, under the
background condition of economic segregation, will always
result in increased inequality, compared to centralized
redistribution. The existence of rising income inequality thus
provides support for shifting the site of revenue collection to
higher levels of government as a general policy, even as
decision-making may be retained at local levels. This
conclusion represents the opposite direction of recent policy
debates, which have proposed sharply curbing or even
eliminating federal support to states and local governments.
The federal government can easily capture the
tremendous wealth that our economy produces, no matter
how it is distributed over geographic space within the
country. From this basic insight, we can both better
understand the shortcomings of the current system and also
make specific recommendations for reform. Instead of
devolving the financing of public investments—whether
schools or courts or infrastructure—to ill-equipped cities and
states, the federal government should respond to rising
economic inequality by assuming responsibility for their
funding.

